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If Clarence Thomas subjected a male employee to the
same treatment he allegedly visited upon Anita Hill,1 the
same federal law that prohibits cross-gender workplace hos-
tile-environment sexual harassment would be available to the
male victim seeking redress. Justice Thomas and his eight
colleagues on the United States Supreme Court announced
this rule in 1998 in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.2 Over a year later, what is substantially less clear is how
courts should apply the Oncale holding to same-sex cases,
particularly those involving facts similar to those presented
in Oncale: same-sex hostile-environment sexual harassment
by a heterosexual harasser whose behavior and motivation is
more hateful than sexually predatory. This is potentially a
problem because in holding that Title VII prohibits sexual
harassment identically for same-sex harassers as for cross-
gender ones, the Court has opened the door to further litiga-
tion of fact patterns like those presented by Oncale. Since
cross-gender hostile-environment sexual harassment has
* Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts.
J.D., Boston University; M.A., University of Liverpool; B.A., Harvard Univer-
sity.
1. Anita Hill testified before Congress that Justice Thomas, then Director
of the EEOC, subjected her, then his subordinate, to the sort of repeated, un-
welcome sexual advances and offensive sexual comments which, if true, would
likely constitute the hostile-environment variety of federally prohibited work-
place sexual harassment. See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE
JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994).
2. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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been deemed illegal whether the harasser desires or hates his
victim, so too must same-sex hostile-environment harassment
be actionable under Title VII in either situation.'
This article reviews the cross-gender hostile-environment
sexual harassment law as well as the limited same-sex sexual
harassment case law available to glean a gender-neutral
standard for evaluating all hostile-environment sexual har-
assment claims. Far from an oxymoron, this gender-neutral
standard is critical to the effective implementation of the On-
cale ruling. Illegal sexual harassment may occur regardless
of the gender combination of harasser and "harassee" and re-
gardless of whether the harasser is motivated by desire or ha-
tred.4
I. BACKGROUND--SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. A Brief History: Two Types of Sexual Harassment
Recognized as Forms of Sex Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the source of
the federal prohibition of workplace sexual harassment.5
However, the anti-discrimination statute itself is silent on
sexual harassment, outlawing only workplace discrimination
"because of... sex."6 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") was the first governmental body to de-
fine illegal workplace sex discrimination to include "sexual
harassment,"7 a term first coined in the early 1970s to de-
scribe the sort of unwelcome sexual advances that were then
rampant between male supervisors and female subordinates.8
The U.S. Supreme Court, while not bound by administrative
agency guidelines as it is by congressional legislation,9 none-
3. See id. Indeed the Court explicitly acknowledged the inclusion of such
claims in its holding: "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire
to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 80.
4. See id. at 75.
5. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
6. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996) (emphasis added). "(a) Harassment on the
basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII. . . . (b) In determining
whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will
look at ... the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the incidents occurred." Id.
8. See J. RALPH LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB, THE LAW OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 201-07 (2d ed. 1993).
9. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
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theless adopted the EEOC statutory interpretation that fed-
eral workplace anti-discrimination law prohibits sexual har-
assment. Further, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson" the
Court held that Title VII outlaws not only the traditional quid
pro quo variety of sexual harassment, but also the more mod-
ern "hostile-environment" type.11
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when submission
to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature is made a
term or condition of the victim's employment or is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting the victim.12 This is
the "old fashioned," explicit, "if you want to get ahead, or at
least keep your job, you'll have sex with me" type of harass-
ment. In contrast, hostile-environment sexual harassment is
less of a blatant threat to the victim's employment status.
This harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the victim's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
The success of a quid pro quo claim rests largely on the plain-
tiffs ability to prove both the unlawful conduct and the pres-
ence of a threat--explicit or implicit-of ill consequences for
failure to submit to the conduct. 4 On the other hand, success-
ful hostile-environment claims do not require proof of a
threat; rather, in addition to proof of the prohibited conduct,
these claims turn on the plaintiffs ability to show that the
conduct created a hostile environment. That is, though the
harassment need not cause a tangible psychological injury, it
must be more than merely offensive: a reasonable person
must find the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to con-
stitute a hostile or abusive work environment. 5
Although the two types of sexual harassment claims are
different, both require proof that the "harasser treats a mem-
ber or members of one sex differently from members of the
10. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. See id. at 65-67.
12. See id. at 65.
13. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65.
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1996).
15. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
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other sex." 6 This is the premise of any sex discrimination
claim, 7 and the basis for the inclusion of sexual harassment
as a type of illegal workplace sex discrimination. In agreeing
with the EEOC that sexual harassment violates Title VII, the
Supreme Court held that "when a supervisor sexually har-
asses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that su-
pervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."'8 Title VII, both
the EEOC and the Supreme Court have concluded, "affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."9
B. Application of Related Legal History to Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims
1. Gender Versus Sexual Orientation
Legal resources available to assist in an analysis of how
to apply Oncale's expansion of Title VII coverage to same-sex
sexual harassment are limited. Lower federal courts" and
the EEOC' have long assumed that "sex" means "gender" in
the context of Title VII. Thus, resolution of sex discrimina-
tion claims under Title VII has turned on whether the offen-
sive treatment occurred "because of' the victim's gender, not
his or her sexual orientation.22 To the extent that same-sex
sexual harassment raises issues of sexual orientation, no
precedent exists for prohibiting such harassment "because of'
16. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) T 3101, § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204 (July 1987).
17. See id.
18. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added).
19. Id. at 65 (referring to EEOC precedents) (alteration in original) (empha-
sis added). See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1980).
20. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979).
21. See Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH), Commission Dec. No. 76-67 §§ 605.17 and
615.2, 2117 and 3101, at 2195-201, No. 77-28, § 615.2, 3101, at 3203-04.
22. See id. While this is a sensible and logical statutory interpretation
based on the limited legislative history available on the addition of "sex" to the
list of characteristics prohibited by Title VII as criteria for workplace decisions,
the U.S. Supreme Court actually has yet to address this issue directly. One way
to resolve the latest question of Title VII coverage of same-sex sexual harass-
ment would have been for the Court simply to define the statutory term "sex" to
include sexual orientation as well as gender. This would have been quite an ex-
treme step, however, since it was apparently far beyond the contemplation of
Congress both when Title VII originally was drafted and when it was more re-
cently amended.
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sexual orientation. 3
The limited treatment of "sex discrimination" in the leg-
islative history of Title VII suggests that the lower federal
courts' construction of the statutory term "sex" is in fact cor-
rect.2 '4 The sketchy legislative history that does exist "evinces
a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women' in employment."25 Dis-
parate treatment includes discriminatory conduct that "cre-
ate[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of
their race, gender, religion, or national origin [because such
an environment] offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace
equality."2 '6 Although the Supreme Court has never directly
confronted this issue, it implicitly accepted the lower courts'
construction of the statutory term "sex" by using the term
"gender" interchangeably with "sex" in Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems." The Harris Court clarified the "reasonable person"
standard for hostile-environment sexual harassment claims
by focusing on the severity of mean-spirited harassing be-
havior visited upon the victim because she was a woman.28
Thus, as the Supreme Court's own language indicates, any
statutory construction that outlaws same-sex sexual harass-
ment must be based on differential treatment due to gender
since Congress meant gender and not sexual orientation
when it included "sex" in Title VII's list of prohibited bases for
workplace decisions.9 Unfortunately, little else is clear about
the congressional intent in outlawing sex discrimination.
2. EEOC Guidelines for Same-Sex Situations
Since there is a paucity of legislative history available to
determine congressional intent of the parameters of sex dis-
crimination," EEOC Guidelines and Supreme Court statutory
interpretation are the most authoritative, although secon-
dary, legal resources available.31 Therefore, it is critical to re-
23. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d 327, 329-30.
24. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
25. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (emphasis added).
26. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphasis added).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 20.
29. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
30. Id.
31. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
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view EEOC Guidelines and the Supreme Court decisions on
sexual harassment 2 for guidance as to who qualifies as a vic-
tim of illegal workplace sexual harassment under Title VII.
The EEOC Guidelines, while explicitly stating that Title VII
does not cover charges of discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation," also explicitly state that "[t]he victim and the har-
asser may be of the same sex."34 The Guidelines also provide,
as an illustrative example, a hypothetical case where a male
supervisor makes unwelcome sexual advances toward a male
employee but not toward a female employee.35 Thus, while
the victim's sexual orientation may not be the basis of a sex-
ual harassment claim, the harasser's orientation may be rele-
vant in so far as it causes him to visit unwelcome sexual ad-
vances on one gender (his own) and not the other. In
Oncale,36 the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the ac-
tionability of such a claim.37
3. Oncale: The Supreme Court on Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment
Importantly, when the Supreme Court held in Oncale
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII, the fact pattern before the Court was quite different from
that of the sexually predatory homosexual harasser presented
in the EEOC illustrative example. 8 In contrast, the harass-
ers in Oncale were heterosexual (as was their victim) and the
alleged harassing behavior, while clearly sexual in nature,
presented no evidence of homosexual desire. 9 Joseph Oncale
alleged that his supervisor and two co-workers sexually har-
assed him while he was employed on an offshore oil rig in late
1991.40 Among the activities in Oncale's complaint were (1)
co-workers restraining Oncale while the supervisor placed his
32. See Harris, 510 U.S at. 17; Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S at. 57.
33. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3101, § 615.2(b)(3) (Example 2), at
3204 (July 1987) (citing Comm'n Decision Nos. 76-67 and 77-28).
34. See id. at § 615.2(b)(3).
35. See id. (Example 1).
36. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
37. See id. at 80 ("The same chain of inference [that sexual proposals would
not have been made to someone of the other sex] would be available to a plain-




40. See id. at 77.
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penis on Oncale's neck and, on another occasion, on Oncale's
arm and (2) the supervisor forcibly pushing a bar of soap into
Oncale's anus while a co-worker restrained Oncale as he was
showering on workplace premises."'
Thus, Oncale opens the door for same-sex claims by het-
erosexual as well as homosexual harassers. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's succinct opinion unequivocally establishes four
things:
(1) Title VII's prohibition of workplace discrimination
"because of... sex" protects men as well as women;
(2) Title VII's prohibition of workplace discrimination
"because of ... sex" includes claims where the plain-
tiff and the defendant are of the same sex;"
(3) "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire to support an inference of discrimination on
the basis of sex";" but
(4) workplace harassment is not automatically sex dis-
crimination "merely because the words used have
sexual content or connotations." Rather, to rise to the
level of sex discrimination, the behavior must meet
the additional statutory requirement that the victim
is being treated differently "because of' his or her
gender.45
Scalia also reiterated the standard set forth in Harris
46
that not all offensive sexual conduct is illegal in the work-
place, but rather only that which "a reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or abusive."
7
Thus, while men may be plaintiffs and may claim harassment
by other men, a three-pronged standard of proof for all hos-
tile-environment sexual harassment cases emerges:
(1) the conduct itself must be of a sexual nature;
(2) the conduct must be visited on the victim because of
the victim's gender; and
(3) the conduct must be objectively bad enough to consti-
41. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
42. See id. at 78.
43. See id. at 79.
44. See id. at 80.
45. See id. at 81.
46. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
47. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
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tute a hostile environment.4"
The second prong of this standard presents unique chal-
lenges when applied to the same-sex harasser. Oncale itself
offers little insight into how to apply Title VII's "because of
... sex" requirement to these situations and the federal ap-
pellate courts have been inconsistent in their attempts to ap-
ply the EEOC Guidelines and Supreme Court jurisprudence
to the emerging issue of same-sex sexual harassment.
C. Pre-Oncale: Circuit Chaos
Before Oncale, the circuits were split three ways on this
issue. First, there was the viewpoint expressed by the Fifth
Circuit in Oncale that no same-sex sexual harassment claim
is cognizable under Title VII.49 This position is erroneous un-
der the Supreme Court's Oncale reversal. ° At the other end
of the legal spectrum, the Eighth Circuit,51 a number of dis-
trict courts, 2 and at least one state court53 allowed all same-
sex sexual harassment claims to proceed under Title VII, pro-
vided that they met the proof requirements of a quid pro quo
or hostile-environment case. 4 The third fork of the pre-
Oncale same-sex sexual harassment decisions took a middle
ground, recognizing only some same-sex sexual harassment
48. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
49. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
50. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75 (1998).
51. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996). Other circuits
had indicated, in dicta, a willingness to entertain same-sex sexual harassment
claims. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); Saulpaugh v.
Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Massachu-
setts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990).
52. See, e.g., Waag v. Thomas Pontiac Buick, 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resort, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996);
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); King v. M.R.
Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905
F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283
(D.D.C. 1995); Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995);
Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Prescott v. Independent
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Sardinia v. Dell-
wood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
53. See Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. 1997).
54. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
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claims as actionable under Title VII. This view had the sup-
port of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits." These cir-
cuits applied the "but for" test articulated by both the EEOC
and the Supreme Court in originally justifying the inclusion
of sexual harassment in the definition of prohibited sex dis-
crimination: 6 but for the victim's sex (i.e., gender), the victim
would not have been harassed. That is, since the victims are
being treated differently than they would if their gender were
different, they are being discriminated against "because
of... sex."" This middle fork allowed same-sex sexual har-
assment claims, but only cases involving gay harassers had
been held to pass this test. 8
1. Wrightson, Yeary, Fredette: Title VII Prohibits Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment Where the Harasser is
Gay
Prior to Oncale, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
had reviewed cases where homosexual superiors had made
unwelcome sexual advances towards male subordinates.59
The courts in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut," Yeary v. Goodwill In-
dustries-Knoxville, Inc.,61 and Fredette v. BVP Management
Associates" each found that the victim was indeed treated dif-
ferently "because of... sex."" All three circuits applied the
EEOC Guideline, which states that "the crucial inquiry is
whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex
differently from members of the other sex."64 Further, each of
55. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996);
Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); Fredette
v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
56. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1997). "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
58. Compare Wrightson, 99 F.3d 138, Yeary, 107 F.3d 443, and Fredette, 112
F.3d 1503, with McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996).
59. See supra note 55.
60. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 138.
61. Yeary, 107 F.3d at 443.
62. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1503.
63. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; Fredette, 112 F.3d
at 1510.
64. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $ 3101, § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204 (1999).
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these circuits, as well as the EEOC,65 distinguished between a
gay harasser who chooses his66 victim because of his gender
(but not because of his sexual orientation) and a gay victim
who is harassed because of his sexual orientation." All three
courts, and the EEOC, held the former situation to be action-
able under Title VII because "the reasonably inferred motives
of the homosexual harasser are identical to those of the het-
erosexual harasser-i.e., the harasser makes advances to-
wards the victim because the victim is a member of the gen-
der the harasser prefers."68 However, none of the courts
addressed a situation of same-sex sexual harassment between
heterosexuals, although such a case was acknowledged to
present more difficult issues," and the EEOC position on such
a case was unclear prior to Oncale.0
While the Wrightson, Yeary, and Fredette courts essen-
tially analyzed their respective cases correctly, they formu-
lated their holdings in a way that failed to address the indi-
vidualized enmity type of hostile-environment claim
presented by Oncale. In effect, each of these courts dealt with
the "easy case." Where sexual harassment is based on indi-
vidualized sexual attraction, the "based on sex" test is easily
met: but for the gender of the victim he or she would not be
attractive to the harasser and so would not be subject to the
unwelcome sexual advances. Certainly these are cases where
discriminatory treatment occurs because of the gender of the
victim, as noted by the EEOC in extending Title VII protec-
tion to these victims.71 The more difficult type of case is that
presented by Oncale, where the harasser is heterosexual and
65. See id. at 3204 (Examples 1 & 2).
66. The use of the male pronoun here is simply because the parties in all
three cases were male. There is nothing in the EEOC or any of these three
cases to indicate that their analysis would be any different if presented with
female-on-female harassment. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, at 3201-
264; Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142; Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1503.
67. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; Fredette, 112 F.3d
at 1510.
68. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505. Accord Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448. The latter
situation, though not before these three courts, is explicitly rejected by the
EEOC. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3101, § 615.2(b)(3) (Example 2), at 3204
(July 1987) (citing Comm'n Decision Nos. 76-67 & 77-28).
69. See, e.g., Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1507.
70. See generally EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3101, § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204
(1999).
71. See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505.
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thus apparently motivated by hatred rather than by desire.7"
2. Quick: Title VII Allows All Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims
Before Oncale, only the Eighth Circuit had held that the
harasser need not be gay for a same-sex sexual harassment
claim to proceed under Title VII.7 Quick v. Donaldson74 was
essentially a case of "goosing" and "bagging":75 the plaintiff
alleged that co-workers grabbed or squeezed his testicles
some 100 times. 6 The plaintiff was heterosexual77 and was
harassed by other heterosexual males," apparently for rea-
sons similar to those in Oncale: he was disliked for not fitting
in with other males in the work environment.79 The harass-
ment of Phil Quick, like that of Joseph Oncale, was not in the
form of "sexual advances," ° or "requests for sexual favors,"8
but rather involved unwelcome comments of a sexual nature
and unwelcome physical contact with Quick's genitals.82 This
type of treatment arguably fits into the third category of be-
havior defined by the EEOC to constitute sexual harassment:
"other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."83 The
Quick court accepted this categorization of the offending be-
havior under Title VII,84 and rejected a requirement of an
anti-male environment for a claim of harassment between
heterosexual males. The court held that, "[p]rotection under
72. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). This assumes that the brief factual discussion
implies by its silence on the issue that both harassers and victim were hetero-
sexual.
73. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1374 (defining "bagging" to be either the intentional grabbing
and squeezing of another's testicles or when one uses one's hands to intention-
ally come into contact with another's groin area). "Goosing" has been defined as
poking or digging someone in some sensitive spot, especially between the but-
tocks with an upward thrust of a finger or hand from the rear. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1993).
76. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374.
77. See id. at 1374, n.1.
78. See id. at 1376.
79. See id. at 1376; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118,
118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
81. Id.
82. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
84. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
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Title VII is not limited to only disadvantaged or vulnerable
groups. It extends to all employees and prohibits disparate
treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that
person's sex. ""
The Quick court outlined the elements of a Title VII hos-
tile-environment sexual harassment claim more specifically
than the Oncale Court:8
(1) membership in a protected group, which the Supreme
Court has acknowledged can be either gender;87
(2) subjection to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(a) "unwelcome" being uninvited and offensive,88
(b) "sexual" not being limited to behavior or com-
ments explicitly sexual in nature but also includ-
ing acts of physical aggression or violence89 and
incidents of verbal abuse which constitute dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult, ° and
(c) "harassment" not necessarily causing a tangible
psychological injury, but being sufficiently severe
or pervasive to constitute a hostile or abusive
work environment in the eyes of both the actual
victim and a reasonable person;91 and
(3) exposure to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed.9"
Since the Oncale facts are similar to those of Quick, the
Quick court would most likely have found that each of these
elements was met in Oncale 3 Most likely Oncale's contact
with his supervisor's penis94 was both uninvited and offensive.
While the assaults on Oncale may not have been explicitly
sexual, the Quick court rejected the notion that the offensive
85. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (emphasis
added).
86. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377-78.
87. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
88. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993).
89. See Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326
(8th Cir. 1994); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988);
Burns, 989 F.2d at 964-65.
90. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65; Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377 (citing
Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014; and Burns, 989 F.2d at 964-65).
91. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
92. See id. at 24.
93. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377-79.
94. See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19.
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behavior must be an expression of sexual interest and focused
instead on the sexual nature of the organs involved in the as-
sault.95 Further, having a bar of soap forcibly inserted in his
anus by his supervisor while being restrained by a co-worker
qualifies as "severe"" conduct which is probably also "physi-
cally . .. humiliating"97 and potentially "affect[ing Oncale']s
psychological well-being."99 Finally, Quick, like Oncale, re-
jected the notion that when a same-sex harasser is hetero-
sexual and is hence motivated by "personal enmity or hooli-
ganism,"99 rather than by sexual desire, the harassment is not
gender-based.' 0 Instead, the Quick court stated that "the key
inquiry [for determining whether discrimination was based
on sex] is whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disad-
vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed."' 1 It appears that,
like the "bagging" in Quick, assaults of the type inflicted on
Oncale were not being visited upon female employees, despite
the apparent absence of any anti-male work environment.'
D. Post-Oncale Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Cases
The Supreme Court, in reviewing Oncale, applied rea-
soning parallel to, but less detailed than, that of the Quick
court 0  Still, the Supreme Court remanded the case, leaving
the application of the law to the Oncale facts to the lower
court.' In so doing the Court left the lower federal courts to
fashion a standard for same sex hostile-environment sexual
harassment cases. To date these courts have largely avoided
the "hard" case, presented by an Oncale-type fact pattern, of a
heterosexual harasser motivated by hatred rather than de-
sire.
95. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
96. See id. at 1378 (listing factors suggested by Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, for
use in assessing whether alleged conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive"
to affect a plaintiffs conditions of employment).




101. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
102. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
103. Compare Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, with Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377-79.
104. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
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Since Oncale, three circuits have addressed same-sex
sexual harassment cases: the Eleventh, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits.' Only one of these cases dealt with a heterosexual
harasser"6 and none is particularly helpful in developing an
applicable standard for such claims. Moreover, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, to which Oncale was remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision, merely passed
the buck, remanding the case back to the district court "for
further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Su-
preme Court." 7 The district court has yet to issue a decision.
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits
In Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits,°8 the Eleventh Circuit,
which already upheld as actionable same-sex sexual harass-
ment by a homosexual harasser in Fredette,°9 analyzed a
claim based on a workplace lesbian romance gone sour."1 In
Llampallas, plaintiffs claim that she was fired in retaliation
for refusing to resume a long-term lesbian relationship with a
co-worker failed, despite the court's acknowledgment that
such a same-sex sexual harassment fact pattern is actionable
under Title VII."' In this case, Llampallas complained not
about the unrelenting requests to resume the sexual relation-
ship, but rather solely about the firing."2 Since someone
other than the harassing co-worker fired her and the court
found that plaintiff lacked any proof that the company presi-
dent who fired her was motivated by the jilted lover, Llam-
pallas's claim failed."' The court found that the facts "belie[d]
a determination that the causal link lay between [the co-
worker's] sexually discriminating animus towards Llampallas
105. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
1998); Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp., No. 97-1490, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
13470 (E.D. Va. June 24, 1998); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, vacated by - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (mem.) (remanding
for further proceedings in light of Oncale); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168
F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
106. Scott, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13470.
107. Oncale, 140 F.3d at 596.
108. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998).
109. By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court allowed this ruling to stand,
consistent with its holding in Oncale.
110. See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1236.
111. See id. at 1247.
112. See id. at 1241.
113. See id. at 1248.
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and Llampallas' discharge.""' Thus, Llampallas was unable
to prove intentional discrimination by her employer as re-
quired under a Title VII claim."5
2. The Fourth Circuit: Scott v. Norfolk Southern
In Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,"' the Fourth Circuit
became the only circuit since Oncale to address a claim of a
heterosexual harasser engaging in same-sex sexual harass-
ment."7 However, the Scott court merely reinstated a retalia-
tory claim after finding that plaintiffs underlying same-sex
sexual harassment claim was cognizable and, thus, something
against which the employer could now properly be alleged to
retaliate."8 No district court decision has yet been issued.
3. The Seventh Circuit: Doe v. City of Belleville and
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp.
The Seventh Circuit, to which the Supreme Court re-
manded Doe v. City of Belleville"' in the wake of Oncale, is
the only circuit to actually attempt to apply Oncale to a same-
sex sexual harassment fact pattern. This case involved alle-
gations by two sixteen-year-old boys that they were called
"queer" and "fag" and were threatened with homosexual rape
by their supervisor while working for the city of Belleville, Il-
linois. 2' Since the Supreme Court's remand order"' there has
been no reported decision.
In Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp,' the Seventh Circuit
reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant employer because it held that the plaintiffs allega-
tions, if proven at trial, could form the basis of a same-sex
114. Id. at 1248.
115. See id. at 1249.
116. Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp., No. 97-1490, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
13470 (E.D. Va. June 24, 1998).
117. See id.
118. See id. (noting that the Fourth Circuit previously had recognized same-
sex sexual harassment claims only when the harasser was alleged to be homo-
sexual or bisexual).
119. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by -
U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998) (mem.) (remanding for further proceedings in
light of Oncale).
120. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 567.
121. Doe, 118 S. Ct. at 1183.
122. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
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sexual harassment claim. 2 ' The plaintiff claimed that the
harasser continually exposed his penis to him and made sex-
ual comments about the plaintiffs body." 4 These facts, if
proved, could form the basis of a claim of same-sex sexual
harassment by a homosexual harasser."5 The harasser made
comments that plaintiff was handsome and, on at least one
occasion, allegedly "rubbed himself into an erection." The
harasser threatened once to "fuck [the victim] in the ass" and,
on another occasion, to give him "a nice hot shower."2 6 While
this case starts the post-Oncale application of Title VII to
same-sex sexual harassment claims, it does not advance the
development of a standard to discern when, absent evidence
of sexual desire, harassing behavior of a sexual nature may
nonetheless be "because of. . . sex."
127
Cases concerning heterosexual same-sex harassers hang
in the wings, awaiting analysis. One way to fashion an ap-
propriate standard to analyze these cases is to separate out
the relevant cross-gender precedents-that is, to separate the
"hatred" cases from the "desire" cases.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Two Distinct Types of Hostile-Environment Sexual
Harassment
Hostile-environment 28 claims can be divided into two
123. See id. at 1012.
124. See id. at 1001.
125. See id. at 1010. The court acknowledged an alternative jury reading of
the facts, namely that the harasser "was not at all interested in [the plaintiff]
sexually, but made these types of remarks and engaged in this type of behavior
simply because he was exceedingly crude and/or because he knew that this type
of sexually charged conduct would make [the plaintiff] uncomfortable." Id. at
1010.
126. Id. at 1009-1010.
127. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
128. A hostile environment has been defined as a workplace affected by
sexually abusive or offensive conduct to such a degree that a reasonable person
would find the conduct to which the victim is subjected sufficiently severe or
pervasive such that it unreasonably interferes with the victim's right to work in
an environment free of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. See
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). See also Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (noting that factors relevant to this
assessment include frequency and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct
is physically threatening or humiliating, whether the conduct unreasonably in-
terferes with the victim's work performance, and the effect of the conduct on the
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types: "desire" claims and "hatred" claims. A "desire" hostile-
environment claim is really a variation on a quid pro quo
claim. The harasser desires the victim and creates an unrea-
sonably offensive work environment by unrelenting, unwel-
come sexual advances.'29 The difference between "desire" and
quid pro quo harassment is simply that submission to the ad-
vances is not made a term or condition of the victim's em-
ployment.3 ' This can be because the harasser lacks the
power to do so (e.g., a co-worker)"' or because the harassment
falls short of that level of coercion." 2  Nonetheless, federal
courts,"' the EEOC,"4 and the Supreme Court"'. all have come
to accept that "harassment leading to non-economic injury
can violate Title VII... where 'such conduct has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.'
136
Such an illegal work atmosphere also may be created by
"hatred" hostile-environment harassment. "Hatred" hostile-
environment harassment is about enmity, rather than desire,
for the victim. In this situation, the harasser inflicts humili-
ating, degrading, mean-spirited treatment of a sexual nature
on the victim because the harasser resents or disdains the
victim--either individually or as part of a group. The easier
sexual harassment case is the latter-where, for example, a
female victim is hated by a male harasser because she is a
woman and the harasser dislikes all women (or, at least, all
women performing a particular job)."7  The harder case is
where the hatred is individualized and the harasser does not
similarly mistreat all members of the victim's gender, but
victim's psychological well-being).
129. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 57.
130. Compare FTC Credit Practices Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1996),
with 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996).
131. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) & (e) (1996).
132. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67-68.
133. See id. at 66 (noting that federal courts accepted hostile-environment
claims even before the Supreme Court did so).
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996).
135. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 66.
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
137. See, e.g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[A] re-
quirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.").
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where the hatred is nonetheless somehow tied to the victim's
sex such that the mistreatment would not have occurred had
the victim been of the opposite gender.'38 For example, the
harasser may resent the victim's particular employment posi-
tion or feel that the victim does not fit into the harasser's no-
tions of what a person of the victim's gender should be like.
While harassment motivated by individualized hatred
may not seem clearly sexual, claims have been held action-
able where a male mistreats a female out of such individual-
ized hatred and where the content of the harassment is re-
lated to the victim's gender or is of a sexual nature.9 The
EEOC addresses this issue by stating:
Sexual harassment is sex discrimination not because of
the sexual nature of the conduct to which the victim is
subjected but because the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from members of the oppo-
site sex. However, it is the sexual nature of the prohibited
conduct which makes this form of sex discrimination sex-
ual harassment. 1
40
In other words, the motivation need not be sexual-just re-
sulting in disparate treatment based on gender-but the pro-
hibited conduct itself must be sexual in some way.
Indeed, the Harris14 ' decision dealt with just such a fact
pattern.' 42 Teresa Harris's supervisor "insulted her because of
her gender [and told her,] 'You're a woman, what do you
know' and 'We need a man as the rental manger' [and that]
she was 'a dumb ass woman.", 43 She was also "often made...
the target of unwanted sexual innuendo[e]s," such as being
asked to get coins from her supervisor's front pants pocket
and to pick up objects up that he had thrown on the ground in
front of her. 44 Once, when Harris was arranging a deal with
a customer, her supervisor asked her, in front of other em-
ployees, "'What did you do, promise the guy . . . some
[sex] ... ?,,,14 Harris was mistreated out of hatred, not sexual
desire, but the harassment was sexual because of the sexual
138. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
139. See id.
140. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3102, § 615.3(a), at 3205 (Jan. 1982).
141. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
142. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (alterations in original).
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nature of the comments and conduct. Since Harris would not
have been treated this way if she were male, the sexual har-
assment was discriminatory and thus prohibited by Title
VII.146 Although this has been the most difficult type of claim
for courts to extrapolate to same-sex scenarios, it is the most
useful template for same-sex "hatred" cases such as Oncale.
B. Desire and Hatred in Same-Sex Cases
1. Quid Pro Quo and Desire Harassment: the "Easy"
Cases
In Oncale,"7 the Supreme Court correctly extended Title
VII protection to both quid pro quo and "desire" hostile-
environment same-sex sexual harassment claims for all of the
reasons discussed above' and set forth in Wrightson,'49 Fre-
dette,5° and Yeary."' Indeed, the EEOC Guidelines already
had explicitly adopted this position,'52 and, as these circuit
courts aptly observed, this result was all but dictated by the
Supreme Court's own language in Meritor Savings Bank:
"[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."'53 Thus, when unwanted
sexual advances (an undisputed form of sexual harassment')
are visited upon someone with either a quid pro quo or a hos-
tile-environment result (both accepted injuries to sustain a
Title VII sexual harassment claim'55 ) and where the harasser
would not make such advances but for the victim's gender,
then the gender of the harasser is immaterial. In these situa-
tions, the victim experiences sexual harassment whether the
harassing supervisor is male or female. The same standards
of proof articulated by the Supreme Court for cross-gender
146. See id. at 21-23.
147. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
148. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
149. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
150. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
151. Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
152. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $ 3101, § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204 (July 1987).
153. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (emphasis
added).
154. See FTC Credit Practices Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
155. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66. See also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(1) & (3) (1996).
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cases should now become applicable for these same-sex
claims: has the plaintiff proven that submission to the alleged
advances was a term or condition of employment,'56 or would a
reasonable person find the environment created by the al-
leged advances hostile or abusive?"7
2. Hatred Harassment: Proof Problems
The quid pro quo and "desire" hostile-environment cases
are the "easy" same-sex sexual harassment claims. The more
difficult question is how to extend protection against "hatred"
harassment to same-sex victims. The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the actionability of "hatred" claims: "[H]arassing
conduct need not by motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex."'58 But the
Court has insisted that a plaintiff still prove that the offen-
sive behavior is being visited upon the plaintiff "because of'
the plaintiffs sex. 9 How do we prove this?
The legal analysis of "hatred" claims in the same-sex
arena, like that of "desire" claims, should parallel the proof
model employed in cross-gender cases. "Hatred" and "desire"
claims share the basic elements of hostile-environment sexual
harassment.6 ' The differences between "hatred" and "desire"
claims are the motivation of the harasser and the nature of
the harassing behavior. Motivation is relevant, as it is in
cross-gender cases, to the extent that the statute has been
construed to require proof that the harassment is "because
of... sex.""' However, it should be irrelevant whether the
motivation is desire for the victim because of his or her sex or
hatred of the victim because of his or her sex, as long as one
or the other is shown to be present. The nature of the har-
assment is relevant, as it is in cross-gender claims, to the ex-
tent that it must fit into one of the three categories of behav-
ior described by the EEOC definitional guideline: "sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature."' "Desire" claims usu-
156. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. See also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(1) (1996).
157. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
158. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
159. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
160. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996). See also Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
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ally involve one of the former two types of behavior, whereas
"hatred" claims are usually based on the third type of behav-
ior, such as the harassing behavior in Harris.6' While proof
of the sexual nature of the harassment in a "hatred" claim of-
ten may not be particularly difficult-e.g., Oncale's supervi-
sor's penis being placed on Oncale's neck and arm while he
was being restrained' 64-proof that the motivation is due to
the victim's gender may be significantly more difficult in a
"hatred" claim than in a "desire" case.
Few courts have been willing to accept "hatred" hostile-
environment claims where individuals harass "one of their
own" out of individualized hatred. 5 The resistance is based
on a notion that one cannot hate one's own gender, so the
harassment must be motivated by hatred of the victim-
having nothing to do with his or her gender-and, thus, the
mistreatment is not occurring "because of' the victim's sex.'66
While the sexual nature of the harassment in some cases 67
seems to indicate that the hatred is, in fact, tied into the vic-
tim's gender in some way, the Quick dissent168 and the Fourth
Circuit 69 both somewhat persuasively distinguish same-sex
"hatred" harassment from cross-gender "hatred" harassment.
The distinguishing feature between these types of cases, ac-
cording to the Quick dissent and the Fourth Circuit, is that
while both may concern conduct that is sexual in nature, the
two situations are not necessarily both motivated by the vic-
tim's gender.
The Fourth Circuit, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County, re-
cently addressed a case where a heterosexual male was sub-
jected to verbal taunts and physical assaults-both of a sex-
ual nature-by heterosexual co-workers. 76  However, the
McWilliams court rejected a same-sex "hatred" sexual har-
assment claim, holding that:
163. See discussion supra Part II.A
164. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
165. See, e.g., Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118; Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
166. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
167. See, e.g., Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118; Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th
Cir. 1996); Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1452.
168. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1380-82 (Nangle, J., dissenting).
169. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1996).
170. See id. at 1193-94.
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[W]e do not believe that in common understanding the
kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male
conduct alleged here (nor comparable female-on-female
conduct) is considered to be "because of the [target's] 'sex."'
Perhaps "because of' the victim's known or believed prud-
ery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexually-
focused speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of' the per-
petrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecu-
rity. Certainly, "because of' their vulgarity and insensi-
tivity and meanness of spirit. But not specifically
"because of' the victim's sex.
171
The Quick dissent agreed with the McWilliams court that
extending Title VII's prohibitions to include same-sex "ha-
tred" sexual harassment claims would offer "unmanageably
broad protection " "' never intended by Congress or the Su-
preme Court.13 The Quick dissent justified excluding same
sex "hatred" claims from Title VII coverage, while allowing
cross-gender "hatred" claims, by arguing that in the latter:
The "because of sex" element is implied in these cases, not
because there is a predominantly male or anti-female en-
vironment, but because "sexual behavior directed at a
woman [by a man] raises the inference that the harass-
ment is based on her sex." Such an inference is not raised
when heterosexuals of one gender harass other hetero-
sexuals of the same gender.1
74
The Quick majority disagreed with the dissent that sex-
ual behavior directed at a member of one's own gender fails to
raise an inference that the harassment is based on the vic-
tims sex.17 The Quick majority would leave it to a jury-as is
the norm'76-to draw whatever inferences seem appropriate
from the facts presented and, thereby, to decide whether the
element of "because of ... sex"e is present in a same-sex "ha-
tred" sexual harassment claim. 7 7 The dissent, along with the
Fourth Circuit in McWilliams,78 considered this to be a mat-
171. Id. at 1195-96.
172. Id. at 1196.
173. See id.
174. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 (Nangle, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
175. See id. at 1378-79.
176. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-24 (1993) (dis-
cussing application of reasonable person standard by fact-finder).
177. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79.
178. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1196 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1996).
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ter of law.9 In Oncale, the Supreme Court concurred with
the Quick majority, stating, "A trier of fact might reasonably
find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by an-
other woman as to make it clear that the harasser is moti-
vated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace."'
Same-sex "hatred" sexual harassment claims may be dif-
ficult to prove because it is often unclear why such harass-
ment occurs. Still, this is an issue of fact and thus is appro-
priately left for the jury, unless it can be said that no
reasonable jury could find a gender-related motivation in
these fact patterns.' This author submits that a reasonable
jury in cases such as Oncale, Quick, and McWilliams indeed
could find that each victim was harassed because of his gen-
der. At the heart of much sex discrimination lie gender
stereotypes that demean, insult, and interfere with the vic-
tim's career progress. Such gender stereotypes are no less
false, unfair, or damaging when they result in unwelcome and
abusive sexual taunting and assault by members of the vic-
tim's own gender. If the victim is ridiculed by a supervisor or
co-workers because the victim does not fit into acceptable
gender stereotypes of what a member of his or her gender
should be like, then the victim's gender is at the heart of the
reason for the harassment. If that harassment is of a sexual
nature, then it is gender-motivated, sexual, and, if sufficiently
severe to pass a reasonable person test, illegal under Title
VII.
As with cross-gender claims, the key factual inquiry is
into whether the harassment is occurring because of the vic-
tim's gender. The EEOC Guidelines urge fact-finders to look
at the totality of the circumstances. 8 ' This, of course, in-
cludes the nature of the sexual conduct,'83 from which infer-
ences of gender-motivated hatred may reasonably be drawn.
Furthermore, as both Quick' and the EEOC'85 point out, the
179. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 (Nangle, J., dissenting).
180. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
181. See id.
182. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1996).
183. See id.
184. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
185. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3101, § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204 (July 1987).
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ultimate proper "motivation" inquiry is: would the victim
have been harassed if he or she were of the opposite gender?
If the answer is no, as it appears to be in Oncale, Quick, and
McWilliams, then an inference of gender-related motivation is
no less legitimate in a same-sex setting than it has been held
to be in a cross-gender situation.'86
III. CONCLUSION
Few courts have addressed "hatred" same-sex hostile-
environment sexual harassment cases to date. Those that
have dealt with the issue have largely ruled against plain-
tiffs. However, Oncale has explicitly made such claims ac-
tionable under Title VII. Therefore, courts must begin to
fashion a standard by which to assess these cases. The courts
rejecting "hatred" same-sex hostile-environment cases have
focused on the fact that it is not always clear that the har-
assment is motivated by the victim's sex.'87 While it is true
that such motivation is relevant since Title VII requires that
the discrimination be "because of ... sex,"' this is a factual
inquiry, not a legal one. Therefore, it is inappropriate to de-
termine as a matter of law that, absent evidence of sexual ad-
vances, 189 same-sex sexual harassment is not occurring be-
cause of the victim's gender. This is a jury question in a
cross-gender case; it should also be a jury question in a same-
sex case.
A comparison of the fact patterns of successful cross-
gender "hatred" cases with rejected same-sex "hatred" claims
reveals that a legal double standard is in effect. As pointed
out by the Quick dissent, when a man directs sexual behavior
at a woman there is an inference that the harassment is
based on sex, but juries are not permitted to make the same
186. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1985).
187. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118
(5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
188. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
189. Regarding the type of harassing behavior exhibited in "hatred" cases,
the language of the EEOC guidelines not only leaves room for including such
behavior in its definition of prohibited activities, but, in fact, the phrase "other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" is superfluous and redundant if it
is not meant to address something other than sexual advances and requests for
sexual favors, which are both separately listed within the definition as exam-
ples of prohibited activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
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inference when a man directs sexual conduct at another man.
Why are juries allowed to use the nature of the conduct as
circumstantial evidence of motivation in cross-gender cases
but not in same-sex cases? When the harassment takes the
form of sexual comments, sexual gestures, and physical con-
tact with sexual organs, it may well be harassment motivated
by the victim's gender, which should properly fall within Title
VII's prohibition. If the harassment is not gender-motivated,
then the jury should be trusted to reject the claim.
In reaching this result, the Supreme Court and Congress
have not extended protection to harassment because of sexual
orientation. If the harassment is motivated solely by the vic-
tim's sexual orientation, then it is not occurring "because
of... sex." If, in contrast, the harassment is motivated by
the harasser's hatred for an individual who does not display
stereotypical characteristics of his or her gender, then the
harassment is occurring because of the victim's gender and
the claim should be allowed to proceed. As for the "sexual"
nature of the harassment itself, this too need not turn on the
sexual orientation of the victim. It is the content and type of
the harassing behavior which should be scrutinized for "sexu-
ality" (as a way to assess its fit into the EEOC definitions of
prohibited conduct), not the sexual orientation of the victim.
The victim's sexual orientation should be irrelevant. In On-
cale,19° Quick,'9' and McWilliams 9' the victims were allegedly
heterosexual.9  The sexual nature of the harass-
ment-goosing, bagging, penis on shoulder or arm, soap
forced up anus-would be no more or less evident if these vic-
tims were gay. Moreover, a victim should not have to choose
between proving their harasser to be gay (to prove a quid pro
quo or "desire" claim) or "coming out" themselves (to prove a
"hatred" claim) to seek redress. Fortunately, Oncale allows
for same-sex sexual harassment protection without requiring
proof of the sexual orientation of either party.'
A same-sex "hatred" harassment claim may seem far
190. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
191. Quick v. Donaldson, Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
192. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.
1996).
193. See supra note 72; Quick, 90 F.3d at 1376; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
194. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
afield of the original intent of Title VII'95 or even the early
sexual harassment claims.9 However, in acknowledging
such a claim in Oncale, the Supreme Court pointed out that
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed."'97 The proof re-
quirements already in place for all sexual harassment claims
will ensure that these same-sex claims do not become either a
form of protection for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or a broad protection for all forms of harassment
of a sexual nature. To be prohibited by Title VII the harass-
ment must not only be sexual in nature but must also occur
because of the victim's gender (not sexual orientation) and
must rise to the level of a hostile environment.
195. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84 (1964).
196. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
197. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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